INTRODUCTION

There are a huge amount of literatures of globalisation and regionalism within the field of international relations (IR), and Asian regionalism has brought about academic debates in recent years. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 provided a new juncture for the structure of globalisation and regionalism. Robert Cox for instance maintains that “[t]he Asian financial crisis of 1998 may well give rise to conflict between global capitalism, which has created conditions for Western firms to gain financial control over Asian productive resources, and Asian governments and people determined to regain control over their economic and political future” (2001: 115). Likewise, Higgott and Phillips observe, “We are experiencing the first serious challenges to the hegemony of neoliberalism as the dominant form of economic organisation since the end of the Cold War” (1999: 5). The post-crisis Asia witnessed a revival of Asian regionalism, so-called Asianisation: a proposal of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), and the foundation of the ASEAN+3 (APT), and Chiang Mai Initiatives (CMI). Within the APT framework, ASEAN and three countries of Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and Korea) have launched...
numerous projects of a regional integration that have been in operation mainly at the government level.

The Asian financial crisis has raised a number of curious questions in the study of globalisation and regionalism: What is regionalism? Is regionalism compatible with globalisation? How globalisation, regionalisation, and regionalism are inter-related? The aim of this paper is to answer such questions by exploring a triangular relation among globalisation, regionalism, and regionalisation. Most of existing IR theories have ill-suited the complex relations among regionalism and regionalisation. They employ particular reductionism: realism on power, liberalism on economic, and constructivism on ideational factors. However, these reductionism are unable to capture the complex and interactive structures of Asianisation. By definition, regionalisation indicates the economic grouping among particular states in the region, while regionalism requires the political construction of the regional identity (Fishlow and Haggard 1992, Haggard 1997). The so-called Asianisation is an interactive development of regionalism and regionalisation—the former articulates the latter and vice versa. This paper will crystallise a double bind of Asianisation: Asianisation, on the one hand, has been constructed as a reaction to globalisation. (The threats of globalisation can be realised in the wake of the financial crisis: “politics of resentment” plays an important role in articulating the threat); on the other hand, although Asianisation expresses hostility to the discourses of globalisation, it does not challenge globalisation as such—Asianisation is not an alternative to globalisation, but a different interpretation of it. In this sense, globalisation and regionalism is neither co-existingly complemented nor mutually excluded, but a bifocal logic between exclusion and supplement. This paper will formulate the complex configuration among globalisation, regionalisation, and regionalism by reviewing three dominant interpretations of IR in explaining Asian regionalism.

This paper composed of four parts: the first three parts will review three major perspectives of IR: realism, liberalism, and constructivism—how they provide sufficient and insufficient accounts for explaining globalisation and Asian regionalism. First, realism argues the so-called “back to the future” scenario: the end of the Cold War destroys the stable international/regional system, and then Asia will go back to the multi-polar world among China, Japan, US, and possibly ASEAN. Second, neoliberalism asserts that the emergence of Asian regional movements can be seen as part of global interdependence: globalisation and regionalism are two sides of the same coin. The emergence of Asian regionalism is not a challenge but an integrating process leading towards globalisation. Thirdly, constructivism argues that a construction of Asian regionalism is open and inclusive rather than closed and exclusive—Asian regionalism has co-existed with global interdependence. Finally, the fourth part will evaluate, as a result of the review of the first three parts, how Asianisation is constructed in relations to globalisation, regionalisation, and regionalism.

REALISM

Regionalism and a question of regional identity can be seen as a direct challenge to the realist framework, because realists regard world politics as power struggles. Realists thus argue that regionalism is not a rise of regional consciousness but the politics of alliance and/or hegemonic formation (Gilpin 1975, 1987, Krasner 1976, Walt 1987). That is, realists reject any distinctions between political and economic regionalism and thus regionalism can be reduced to a hegemonic alliance. This is because, “regional groupings form in response to external challenges and there is no essential difference between economic and political regionalism” (Hurrell 1995: 340).

A number of realists seem to point out that there is no East Asian regionalism (i.e., regional awareness and identity), and propose the “back to the future” scenario: due to the end of the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific region will return to the multi-polar world with the absence of particular hegemonic states. Such instability takes Asia back to the classical balance of power politics, which Europe experienced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: “Europe’s past could be Asia’s future” (Friedberg 1993: 7, see also Gilpin 1997).

There are basically four reasons for realists to believe the multi-polar Asia: the rising power of China and Japan, arms races and territorial disputes among Asian states, and weak institutionalisation. Firstly, the practices of APEC, according to realists, demonstrate the hegemonic management and struggle in the region—the United States as a hegemonic state, with China and Japan as challengers (Bobrow 1999: 183). On the one hand, the United States has still maintained a dominant position in terms of economics, military, and identity factors. On the other hand, the rise of China and Japan as regional powers can be seen as
the challenger (the potential challengers are suspicious of, and suspect one another). That is, China and Japan have tried hard to align against the American hegemony (ibid). Although the United States had become clearly hegemonic in the Asia-Pacific region by the 1970s, it has been contested since the 1990s—there is no single hegemonic state in the region. Japan, by the early 1990s, became the significant challenger to stable American hegemony in terms of trade and investment: “The US economic pre-eminence has been replaced by Japan in many regards” (Crone 1993: 509). Asian NICs also become potential challengers to the American domination of the regional economy: “[i]n 1987 Taiwan and Hong Kong ranked third and fifth as investor in Thailand, and in 1989 Taiwan was a close second to Japan in Malaysian investment approvals (the US was sixth)” (ibid). Furthermore, the US military presence has been relatively “reduced and disaggregated from economic issues” (ibid: 510). In brief, American hegemony has largely declined in the Asia-Pacific region, and instead, China and Japan have risen as regional hegemonic states.

Likewise, Richard Betts also emphasises the emergence of China and Japan as regional super powers: especially, economic development of China and military development of Japan (1999: 51–2, see also Shirk 1997). More particularly, in contrast to the United States, military expenditures in China and Japan have increased since the end of the Cold War: while the United States reduced its military expenditures by 11.2 per cent during 1990–93, Japan increased its expenditures by 38.2 per cent, and China increased by 20.6 per cent respectively (Betts 1993: 41–2). Thus, numerous realists commonly argue that the Asia-Pacific region has witnessed a regional system that has changed from the American uni-polarity to the multi-polarity among China, Japan, and the United States.

Secondly, realists point out arms race among Asian countries as evidence of a multi-polar Asia. According to the table below, five out of the nine countries in East Asia have spent more on defense expenditure in the period between 1985–95. Also, realists often refer to the steady increase in military spending by China and Japan as evidence of an arms race in East Asia.

Thirdly, realists often cite regional political and territorial disputes, especially in Northeast Asia, as evidence of balance of power politics. For instance, they include the political tension between China and the United States since Tiananmen, China’s military exercise during Taiwan’s

Presidential election campaign, the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and between Japan and South Korea over Takashima/Tokdo island, and more importantly, political tensions on the Korea Peninsula, such as suspicion over North Korea’s nuclear development and North Korea’s submarine invasion in Japan’s territorial sea (Hara 1999, Yamakage 1997).

Finally, since realists under evaluate ideology and identity (Peou 2002: 121), they strongly criticise the Asian identity arguments—while, in Europe, “political similarities are supported by rough cultural unity,” “… in the [Asia-] Pacific the similarities are barely skin deep” (Segal 1991: 179, 181). Furthermore, a number of the institutional frameworks, such as APEC, ARF, and ASEAN, according to realists, seem to have failed—ASEAN, for instance, is an “embryonic security community” and has “never been more than an inter-government entity” (Leifer 1989: 157, 153). This is because these institutions are too “young and weak”—although there have been various meetings among political and bureaucratic leaders that generated a number of important declarations and principles, these have yet to resolve significant political disputes.
among Asian states (Friedberg 1998: 6). Despite a number of efforts at constructing regional identities, Asian states still lack the solid ideas of regional cooperation and solidarity—"Asianess" has yet to be constituted. Instead, realists tend to acknowledge the issues of regional identity formation as a scheme of power politics. "The current emphasis on Japan's 'Asianess' can also be seen as an attempt to construct a myth of Asia in order to ease the way, both at home and in neighbouring countries, for an increased Japanese economic and political roles in the region" (Friedberg 1993: 24, note 66).

However, a number of realist arguments are simply disproved by the numerous empirical facts. Firstly, no hegemonic systems have survived in the region—there has been no alternative to American hegemony—neither Japan nor China has a will and capacity to form a regional system (Higgott 1993: 299). In reality, the biggest powers like Japan and China do not want to exercise hegemonic power alone. Instead, the small countries, including Singapore and Malaysia, are in favour of constructing a regional community. "Leaders in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand have all urged Japan to demonstrate greater regional political leadership" (Johnson and Keehn 1995: 110). Realism is thus unable to explain why Japan and China are indifferent to a construction of regional institutions to exercise their hegemonic powers. More clearly, APT has been seen as a direct challenge to realism. The numerous proposals in building APT as a regional regime have been suggested by the smaller, such as Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore, rather than the bigger regional powers, like China and Japan. Further, if the potential hegemonic states like Japan and China are suspicious of one another, it could not explain why Japan and China joined and cooperate APT together. The stronger Asian powers, like China and Japan, oppose rapid moves toward a formal institutionalisation of regional bodies, while the weaker powers, such as ASEAN, call for stronger institutions (Katzenstein 1997: 23).

Secondly, although a number of Southeast Asian states have raised their defence spending for the last ten years, the defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP has totally decreased with the exception of the Philippines. Increasing defence spending is rather explained by "...domestic price inflation or higher procurement costs for imported arms and not reflect a genuine desire to boost fire power" (Busse 1999: 41). Another finding indicates that China's total defence budget is just $6.72 billion, only 2.27 per cent of the US, and 17.6 per cent of its Japanese counterparts respectively (Chen 1993: 246). In conclusion, there is no arms race in East Asia, since the growth of defence spending is less fast than the growth of GDP. Furthermore, although there are some territorial disputes in the region, these disputes do not seem to lead to inter-state conflict among regional powers. Ball lists 29 territorial disputes in the region: 6 and 3 issues are involving with China and Japan respectively, and 17 issues are intra-ASEAN territorial disputes. Interestingly, none of the disputes is resolved by the forces, most of them are processing diplomatic negotiation (see Ball 1993).

Finally, East Asian state relations among ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea, since the 1990s, have become unlikely to result in conflict. The relations of these countries have become much warmer in recent years. First, Japanese prime ministers and government officials since the 1980s have continuously visited ASEAN countries and especially in the case of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, whose visit in 1983, have held consultations on security dialogue between ASEAN and Japan. Although the security cooperation between them is as yet unclear, the regular visits by Japanese defence agency officials may represent progress in preparing for further security cooperation between them (Hughes 1996: 236–7). Since the Miyazawa doctrine of January 1993 at Bangkok, ASEAN and Japan have gone further to strengthen their security dialogue to promote regional stability. Although ASEAN countries were cautious about the re-emergence of Japanese military power until the 1970s, they...
became much friendlier in the 1990s. Although Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, for instance, noted in 1969: “My generation and that of my elders cannot forget (the Japanese World War II occupation) as long as we live. We can forgive but we are unlikely to forget,” he argued in 1991 that “Japan will not find military aggression either necessary or profitable. So by all reason and logic, there should be no fear of a Japan return to military aggression...” Therefore, fear of Japan’s re-militarisation is more emotional than rational (cited by Singh 2002: 282, 292). Rather, ASEAN countries have allowed Japan to play a greater role in the regional political economy. Mahathir’s comment might be summarized as general sentiments among ASEAN members: “as we approach the year 2000, it is our hope that Japan will initiate changes in its policies that will effectively bring about an enhanced political, sociocultural role in not only the Southeast Asia region but also in the global context” (Ibid: 286).

Second, while Japan and South Korea have, for many decades, faced a number of difficulties in the security cooperation arena due to past colonial experiences: “for Korea, too, and also for historical reasons, there is distrust of Japan, fuelled by the continuance of unfinished business with that country” (Foot 1995: 223), Japan and South Korea, especially in the post-Cold War context, have come to seek much closer cooperation on security (Hughes 1996: 238). These changes are reflected by a number of official documents. The South Korean Defence White Paper asserts, “[w]e will try to expand mutual understanding and confidence between our armed forces and the Japanese Self Defence Forces based on existing military exchanges, while seeking ways to play a positive role to maintain political stability and achieve peaceful reunification on the Korean Peninsula” (Ministry of Defence 1993: 126). Also, the Japanese Defence Agency’s White Paper 1995 states, “[t]he deepening of mutual understanding, and the exchange of opinions between Japan and South Korea about security matters of common concern, is of great benefit to peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the whole of the Asia-Pacific region” (National Defence Agency 1995: 197).

Finally and foremost, security relations between China and Japan have been much warmer since the late 1980s. In 1987, the director general of the Japanese Defence Agency paid his first visit to China and began security dialogue with the Chinese. In 1992, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa held a discussion on the future security structure of the region, and, at the bureaucratic level, dialogue between the Chinese Defence Minister and the Japanese Defence Agency begun in 1995 (Hughes 1996: 241). On the one hand, many specialists based in China conclude that there is little likelihood of the re-emergence of Japanese militarism: “...Japan will not lightly change its well-known Yoshida doctrine emphasising economic development rather than military build-up. Japanese re-militarisation is just one possibility, not an inevitable development” (Chen 1993: 240). On the other hand, China has gradually abandoned its hegemonic approach to the region in the post-Cold War context (Chen 1993, Forgès and Xu 2001). “Hence, in terms of its security environment, China now enjoys a much better situation than at any time after 1949” (Chen 1993: 239). Although many countries have territorial disputes with China, this does not increase the likelihood of regional conflict because “China’s consistent policy is to settle territorial disputes peacefully, through negotiation” (ibid: 246). Chinese Premier Li Peng, for example, visited Vietnam and the two governments reconfirmed their will to resolve territorial disputes peacefully through negotiation as well as agreeing to widen their cultural and economic exchanges (ibid: 247).

In short, the realists’ argument for a multi-polar Asia has been outdated by a number of empirical evidences. First, there seems to emerge no hegemonic state in Asia: neither Japan nor China has approached regional politics in order to practice their hegemony. Further, the construction of the regional community to date has been not hegemonic-driven, but small countries have proposed it—relationship among Asian countries is much more flat than realists assume. Second, expansion of military spending among Asian countries does not mean potential conflicts in the region, because the defence expenditures against GDP ratios have rather decreased. Finally, political relations amongst ASEAN, and three Northeast Asian countries (China, Japan, and South Korea) have been much warmer in the recent years. Thus, their concerns about Asia’s multi-polarity do not seem to be realised.

LIBERALISM

Neo-liberal institutionalism (most notably Keohane and Nye), contends that the inter-state system enters the structure of globalisation with the functionalist/rationalist logic. Like realism, neo-liberalism also under-evaluates the rise of Asianisation: globalisation and regionalisation (and regionalism), according to neo-liberalism, can be reduced to states'
rational actions, and the rise of regionalism and regionalisation has directed to the global integration of world interdependence. In other words, while regionalisation constitutes a temporal alliance among states for surviving global competition, the inter-state structure has totally converged into the state of globalisation. Thus, globalisation and regionalism, according to neo-liberalism, have been complemented rather than an alternative to an economic logic of state strategic interaction—neo-liberalism thus rejects the logic of political regionalism as identity formation. Relying on functionalist logic, they provide three contentions how nation-states and regions have entered global interdependence: (1) there has been a dramatic increase in the "density and depth" of economic interdependence: (2) information technology and the information revolution have played a massive role in diffusing knowledge, ideas, and technology across the world: (3) these developments have created and enhanced material infrastructures in strengthening societal interdependence (Hurrell 1995, Keohane and Nye 1977). That is, increased levels of global interdependence have promoted the demand for global international regimes/cooperation among states.

More recently, Keohane and Nye define globalisation/globalism as "a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multi-continental distances" (2000: 105). Neo-liberal institutionalism maintains that the strategic interaction among states has given rise to the emergence of state cooperation. For this perspective, globalisation and regionalisation are two sides of the same coin: globalisation and regionalisation are interconnected and both stem from strategic state interactions that have gone forward to globalisation mechanism. The emergence of regional regimes (ASEAN, EU, NAFTA, etc.), according to neo-liberal institutionalists, witnesses the results of strategic state interactions, and cannot be seen in the context of balance of power politics and the question of identity. In short, neo-liberal institutionalists acknowledge regionalisation as a growing step to global interdependence.

On the other hand, they also contend that there has been no such thing as regionalism—globalism forms against the tides of regionalism. First, globalisation, with the growth of interdependence, has raised "new global issues", such as the environment, refugees, and humanitarian issues. These issues have been dealt with by issue-specific international regimes (UNEP, UNHCR, etc.), rather than particular regional organizations. Secondly, the expansion of economic interdependence and state cooperation across the OECD countries relies on Western-centric institutions (e.g., the Bretton Woods institutions, OECD, G7), rather than regional bodies. Third, global finance, production, and trade architectures increase the state/firm alliance and inter-regional trade, rather than intra-regional (Hurrell 1995: 345-6). However, the Asian financial crisis rather witnessed the reversal effect of this Western-centric global framework—the IMF attempts to resolve the financial crisis, but the Asian countries rather resisted the IMF resolutions as a global framework. Instead, the Asian states have pursued regional-based, not global, and Asian-only, not Western-centric, institutions such as APT. The subsequent years of the Asian financial crisis have provided the strongest evidence for a region-wide community building ever before. It is notable that the chief characteristic of an emerging regionalism (and Asianisation) is a construction of Asian-only institutions that "excludes the United States and other Western Hemisphere members" (Henning 2002: 1).

Thus, the neo-liberal expectation that global institutions fix global issues is not an adequate account for post-crisis Asian regionalism and Asianisation. Also, although they maintain that the rise of inter-regional economic flows are strong evidence of the globalisation of the international political economy, numerous empirical data, by contrast, show the rise of intra-regional trade and an emergence of regionalism. While there is an increasing development of global interdependence among regions, such as Asia, Europe, and North America (inter-regional trade), some empirical evidences also imply that world trade has shifted toward regionalisation (intra-regional trade) (Hurrell 1995: 346). Regionalist tenor goes further to expand in recent years. The following tables indicate growths of intra- and inter-regional trade respectively.

In short, neo-liberal contention of globalisation and regionalisation is insufficient in two respects: First, there is little indication of international economic flows that have directed to inter-regional and global interdependence rather than an emergence of regionalism. Reality is twofold: not only inter-regional but also intra-regional economic flow has expanded—there is no single path from regionalisation to globalisation situations are much more complex than neo-liberalism asserts. Second and foremost, the Asian financial crisis and the emergence of Asian-only institutions like APT strongly disproved neo-liberalism. Instead of global framework, the IMF, Asian states have proposed AMF and formed APT and CMI. In other words, the post-crisis Asian regionalism witnessed regional resistance to globalisation.
CONSTRUCTIVISM

Unlike realism, constructivists focus on ideational and identity formations in constructing regionalism. Regionalism is, for constructivists, not a politics of alliance but a social construction of regional identity. Wendt puts that "[c]onstructivists are interested in the construction of identities and interests, and, as such, take a more sociological than economic approach to systemic theory. On this basis, they have argued that states are not structurally or exogenously given but constructed by historical contingent interactions" (1994: 385).

Constructivists argue that Asian regionalism seems to be open to the global market. Most notably, Peter Katzenstein develops a number of neo-liberal notions with constructivist modifications. He underlines non-institutionalised market-based Asian regionalism rather than political-based formal organisational building. "... Asian regionalism", Katzenstein argues, "tends toward openness. Because Asian states operate by consensus rather than by majority vote in regional organisations, each individual Asian states exercised effective veto power over all collective actions" (1997: 1-2). Contrary to the "close," "exclusive," and "hard" regionalism in Europe, Asia has constructed, according to Katzenstein, an "open," "inclusive," and "soft" regionalism (Ibid: 27). Similarly to neo-liberal institutionalism, constructivists maintain globalisation and regionalisation/regionalism has arguably been not alternative but compatible—Asian regionalism promotes intra-regional networking on the one hand and inter-regional interdependence on the other hand. "Instead, globalisation and regionalism are complementary processes. They occur simultaneously and freed on each other, thus leading to growing tension between economic regionalism and economic multilateralism" (Katzenstein and Shiraishi 1997: 343).

More importantly, Katzenstein argues that the Asian financial crisis has strongly implied the limit of "exclusive" Asian regionalism. Although the financial crisis has increased Asian suspicions of Western institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, the Asian regional approach in the aftermath of the crisis has rather associated with the American commitments and/or the global approach to the region. "An IMF-centred, global approach to the regional financial crisis rather than reliance on an Asian-centred Japanese-led effort revealed the weakness of an exclusive and cohesive East Asian regionalism without US involvement. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis the links between Asian regionalism and global financial market have grown stronger" (Katzenstein 2000: 22). More evidently, it has been argued that the failures of Asian exclusive institutional building—not only EAEC but also AMF, strongly demonstrate the difficulty of constructing exclusive and close regionalism in the region. "Japan's response to the Asian economic crisis after the summer of 1997 confirmed the point yet again and demonstrated how difficult it is for the Japanese government to adopt a policy of Japan-centred, exclusive regionalism" (Kato, K. 2000: 35).

Kato goes further to argue that East Asia, especially Japan, notwithstanding the growth of intra-regional linkages, still relies on the
international markets to a large extent: trade, investment, and technology. In trade, while East Asia has recently emerged as an important trading region for Japan, Japanese trade since the 1960s has been perfectly balanced between OECD and non-OECD countries. FDI more clearly indicates the Japanese reliance on global interdependence—the dominant amounts of Japanese FDI are still concentrated in North America, while FDI on Asia has rapidly increased. In the aftermath of the crisis, Japanese MNCs have shifted their business strategies in much more global directions rather than the regional basis (Ibid: 55-62).

However, the ongoing institutionalisation of APT has also been a direct challenge to their assessment of the openness of Asian regionalism. This is because APT has constituted only Asian members and it shares common features with EAEC and AMF in many ways. Numerous discursive practices in the aftermath of the crisis what Richard Higgott calls “Politics of Resentment” (1998), has advocated, rather than refrained, the construction of the exclusive Asian political frontier. APT represents a sort of the exclusive Asian regionalism, similarly to EAEC, aims to exclude Anglo-Saxon members (Milner 2000, Ravenhill 2002, Webber 2001), and intends to counter the United States-led world structure, such as the Bretton Woods system (Christoffersen 2002: 370). APT has played a quite important role in the process of the regional community building (Stubbs 2003, Thomas 2002).

Moreover, constructivists, although they attempt to scope with ideational factors, too much focus on economic settings—they reduce a construction of regional identity to intra- and inter-regional economic linkage, rather than focus on an interactive process between regionalism and regionalisation, and/or between political and economic factors. In other words, constructivism passes over political factors like “politics of resentment”—their emphases on economic combination between globalisation and regionalism are not wrong but are unable to grasp the complex process of Asianisation. In many ways, regionalism has grown as a defensive reaction to globalisation. Many evidences, which demonstrate a synthesis between global and regional economic flows, simply explain the economic process of regionalisation, rather than regionalism and the wider-range of Asianisation. A number of discursive practices show the political construction of regionalism that has resented and antagonised the IMF and the United States. In other words, the empirical data on the inter-regional economic interdependence do not mean the openness of Asian regionalism. That is, although Asia still relies on global interdependence on the one level, the discursive practices in advocating Asianisation have attempted to exclude the Western and globalist tenor. Constructivism only explains economic regionalisation rather than a complex and interactive contingency of Asianisation.

Figure 6 simulates how much each country/region gains in the following three cases: a complete East Asian trading bloc, a complete Asia-Pacific trading bloc, and complete world-wide trade liberalisation (globalisation). Although the graph well-describes why the United States is eager to process APEC institutionalisation, it cannot explain why Japan and China have enthusiastically involved regionalism, since liberalisation of global market is the most fruitful for them. Contrary to what the graph shows as globalisation being the most advantageous for them, Japan and China have engaged in Asian regionalism while it is less advantageous. Since regionalism is subjectively defined, the empirical (and objective) observation on regionalisation is unable to explain Asian regionalism.

EVALUATING ASIANISATION OF ASIA

The previous parts investigated the existing perspectives on IR explaining Asianisation. As in the examinations above, many arguments by realists are disproved by numerous empirical facts, and neo-liberalism and
constructivism fail to explain how regional identity is constructed: they plunge into particular reductionism: their account is about economic regionalisation rather than Asianisation as a whole. This part of this paper will argue two propositions: (1) what regionalism is: regionalism is subjectively defined and that are unable to be measured by positivism, and (2) how globalisation, regionalisation, and regionalism are related: regionalism is the specific way of identification—regionalism antagonises globalisation, but it is supplemented by regionalisation.

**What Is Regionalism?**

Unlike regionalisation that can be economically and objectively measured, political regionalism is (inter-) subjectively defined—the emergence of regionalism is thus not a direct outcome of rational behaviours of states to seek national interests as realists maintain, but an engagement of region-wide identity formation. This is because “policy is neither formulated nor implemented in the absence of ideas, knowledge, and ideology… national interest is the outcome of a combination of both power and value” (Higgott 1997: 15, 20). Political regionalism and economic regionalisation are not strictly bounded but articulated by discourses—it is a limit of positivist analysis. In analogy with Benedict Anderson’s imagined community (1983), they share a view that the region is discursively constructed as an “imagined region” (Higgott 1997, Hooke 1997). “Communities can be constructed even in the absence of cultural similarities or economic transactions between groups through the creation and manipulation of norms, institutions, symbols, and practices that significantly reduces the likelihood of conflictive behaviour” (Acharya 1998: 206). That is, Asianisation is an articulation of particular regional discourses across a boundary between political and subjective meaning of regionalism, and economic and objective setting of regionalisation in abstract level.

Contrary to constructivists, the social construction of imagined region has been put forward exclusively. “The new Asian discourse resists the ideological hegemony of the USA within the context of an ‘Asia Pacific’ discursive strategy of the USA and its acolytes such as Australia” (Higgott 1997: 42). On the one hand, the transformation of Asian regionalism in the aftermath of the financial crisis can be seen as the “Politics of Resentment” (Higgott 1998)—leaders of Asian states are antagonising the IMF and the United States in particular and the West in general. The anti-Western hostility provides the basis of new articulation of Asian regionalism. On the other hand, the construction of Asian regionalism is a framework of “leadership” (Stubbs 2003) or Gramscian sense of “hegemony” (Nabers 2003) rather than realist’s notion of hegemony. “The Leader must conform to the already established expectations of his followers” (Rose 1977: 310, also Stubbs 2003: 2), the notion of leadership is “essentially contextual” (Stubbs 2003: 3)—the nature of leadership is the interactive process of expectations between the leader and followers. The Asian financial crisis as the “Organic Crisis” (Nabers 2003: 117) is Gramsci’s sense of endorsement of a new hegemonic identity of Asian regionalism.

Thus the Asian financial crisis provides two implications of conceptualising Asianisation. On the one hand, Asianisation is an interactive between regionalism and regionalisation (the boundary between regionalism and regionalisation is not fixed but shaped by discourses)—most of dominant interpretations laps reductionism and overlap the discursive construction of Asianisation. On the other hand, Asian regionalism in the aftermath of the crisis is not open—post-crisis institutions like APT exclude non-Asian members, because post-crisis regionalism is constructed by resentments and antagonism of the West.

### Figure 6 Effect of the regionalism formations for each country (billions US dollar)

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**Source:** Scollay and Gilbert 2001
in general, and the IMF and the United States in particular. Asian regionalism is thus constructed as a resistance to globalisation.

Globalisation, Regionalisation And Regionalism

Neo-liberalism and constructivism explore that globalisation and regionalisation, as economic logic, have complemented regional economic integration—an integration of regional economic flows that can be seen as a complementary step toward globalisation. However this is not wrong, but not an overall picture. The Asian financial crisis and “politics of resentment” witnessed that globalisation and regionalism have been in antagonistic relation, since the latter is the defensive reaction against the former. This process is obvious in institutional arrangements since the financial crisis—a number of regional frameworks (APT and CMI) can be seen as defensive reactions to the threats of globalisation.

Asianisation is not a simple exclusionary practice but more than that. Although Asian regionalism excludes Western discourses of globalisation, it does not mean regional isolationism and Asia’s left out of the international system. In short, Asianisation does not challenge globalisation itself (as the existing system of international political economy) but provides different interpretation of, and, revising and adjusting it. That is, Asianisation has attacked the globalisation discourses, not globalisation as such.

“Despite the emphasis placed on a new sense of common identity as a facilitator of united East Asian action to balance Western economic dominance, the post-crisis initiatives taken by several East Asian governments have been directed as much at forging closer link with Western partners as constructing an exclusive East Asian bloc” (Ravenhill 2002: 191).

Accordingly, despite strong endorsement, the East Asian region is still strongly linked to the global market. This relation can be seen as what Derrida calls supplementality—regionalism has been also supplemented by regionalisation, because the political project of regionalism both excludes globalisation as an outside on the one hand, and be supplemented by regionalisation (and/or internationalisation) on the other. Despite its hierarchical dichotomy between inside and outside, both are synthesising in the form of origin and supplement—that is to say, an outside (supplement) supplements the lack of inside (origin).

“The question is of an originary supplement, if this absurd expression may be risked, totally unacceptable as it is within classical logic. Rather the supplement of origin—which supplements the failing origin and which is yet not derived—this supplement is, as one says of a separate part [unepîeté], of the original make [origine] (or a document, establishing the origin)” (Derrida 1976: 313).

Thus, an overall picture should look like the above. While globalisation and regionalisation are complemented, globalisation and regionalism are antagonised. As a whole, Asianisation is constituted as double bind—although practices of regionalism have been articulated by excluding forces of globalisation as a constitutive outside, the inter-regional and intra-regional integration seem to co-exist. In short, a culmination of Asianisation does not mean Asia’s clear break from the international political economy, but supplementing it. For instance, the Joint Ministerial Statement of APT at Chiang Mai says:

“In order to strengthen our self-help and support mechanisms in East Asia through the ASEAN+3 framework, we recognised a need to establish a regional financial arrangement to supplement the existing international facilities. As a start, we agree to strengthen the existing cooperative frameworks among our monetary authorities through the ‘Chiang Mai Initiatives’” (Joint Ministerial Statement 2000: my emphasis).

Likewise, Lee Yock Suan, Minister of Trade and Industry, Singapore, asserts that
“Globalisation is an inevitable process. Those who embrace it can harness its benefits. However, appropriate domestic policy measures and frameworks to strengthen the regulatory regimes and financial institutions must be put in place first. In addition, parallel measures need to be taken to improve the competitiveness of domestic enterprises as well as the skills of the workforce” (cited by Yeung 2000: 147).

Although Asians appreciate merits of globalisation, they attempt to revise and adjust it in their own way—this is the antagonism between the Asianisation discourse and the globalisation discourse. It, however, does not mean that Asia abandons all features and mechanisms learning from the West, and leaves out of global political economy—they never close their door to outside of the region, but their reforms emphasise revision and adjustment of the Western model of globalisation. This is a combination between Asian culture and philosophy on the one hand, and Western knowledge and technology on the other hand. In brief, Asian ways, on the one hand, have strongly differentiated and antagonised the West and globalisation in general, the IMF and the United States in particular. On the other hand, Asian ways has been supplemented by Western ways in numerous instances: internationalisation (not globalisation discourses) and liberalisation (not American style of de-regulation). The logic of supplement appeared in a number of statements by Mahbubani, Foreign Minister of Singapore. On the one hand, he strongly criticised the West—the West in general and the United States in particular misunderstand “that others will model themselves after Europe, that the natural progression of history will lead to all societies becoming liberal, democratic, and capitalist. This assumption creates an inability to accept that other cultures or social forms may have equal validity” (1995: 105). On the other hand, he also acknowledges the usefulness of the Western knowledge and methods:

“The region must also accept that the march of technology is irreversible. The Internet, fax machines, and satellite TV have opened up every society in the Asia-Pacific... The East Asian middle class, whose number will soon approach 500 million, is developing an understanding of American society’s strengths and weaknesses. Its members can make informed choices about the kind of society that they want to create for themselves” (1998: 155).

There is the hierarchical value system—Asia over the West on the one hand, and, at the same instant, the West outside supplements Asia inside. Mahbubani describes, “[T]he Asian renaissance is here to stay, with or without American involvement” (Ibid). This is what Sakakibara calls the combination between “Western technology and Oriental philosophy” (Sakakibara 1995: 13). Likewise, Aihwa Ong puts:

“At a broader regional level, East Asian and ASEAN countries often take a common moral stance—saying no to the West—to the epistemic violence wrought by neo-liberal orthodoxy, but at the same time, they disguise their own investment in the rationalities global capitalism. Globalisation in Asia, then, has induced both national and transnational forms of nationalism that not only reject Western hegemony but seek, in panreligious civilisational discourses, to promote the ascendancy of the East” (1999: 18, my emphasis).

On the one level, the regional approach inside excludes the global approach outside by advocating regionalism, but on the other level, Asian regionalism as the origin has been supplemented by the global approach. In short, empirical evidences supporting internationalisation of the Asian economy do not disprove the discursive construction of exclusive Asian regionalism. Asianisation is an ambivalent discursive practice between exclusion and supplement—globalisation and regionalism is neither simply complemented nor mutually exclusive.

**CONCLUSION**

This paper reviewed three dominant perspectives in explaining Asianisation. Existing frameworks of IR, however, fail to explain an emergence of Asianisation. This is because realism under-evaluates roles of political and subjective construction of regional identity, and neoliberalism and constructivists reduced it to regional economic linkage—the overall picture is more complex than they assert. Totally, Asianisation is double bind—Asianisation challenges the globalisation discourse on the one level, but it is also supplemented by regionalisation/internationalisation (the existing system of global political economy) on the other level. Asianisation is not an alternative to globalisation but a
different interpretation of it. The construction of Asian regionalism is thus maintained by double logic between exclusion and supplement.

REFERENCES


